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Introduction
On February 6 2015, the Act of 15 January 2015 amending the Waste Act and certain 
other acts came into force.1 Article 5 of this act imposes on the regional assemblies of 
the voivodeships the obligation to update the voivodeship Waste Management Plans,2 
and the resolutions concerning their implementation by 30 June 2016. As a consequence, 
all the voivodeships are now intensively working on updating and adopting these docu-
ments. Due to the still insufficient number of facilities in the country that fulfil the 
requirements necessary for granting them the status of a  Regional Municipal Waste 
Processing Facility,3 there will undoubtedly be regions of the waste management in-
dustry where the number of RMWPF facilities does not ensure the fulfilment of the 
conditions of full competition. In this context, the provision Article 9, section 1, item 2 
of the Maintenance of Cleanliness and Order in Municipalities Act of 13 September 
1996,4 in accordance with which mixed municipal waste and green waste have to be pro-
cessed at a facility with RMWPF status. It is therefore rather likely that, in certain cases, 
a RMWPF operator will have a very strong position on the market of this kind of waste 
treatment, which will constitute a dominant position in accordance with the provisions 
of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act of 16 February 2007.5 In this paper, 
the authors discuss the conditions that must be met in order to be able to assert that the 
1 Dz.U. of 2015, item 122, hereinafter: WA.
2 Hereinafter referred to as WMP.
3 Hereinafter also: RMWPF These requirements are specified in detail in Article 35 section 6 of 
the Waste Act of 14 December 2012 (Dz.U. of 2013, item 21 as amended). They concern, inter 
alia, the facilities’ guarantee that certain waste treatment processes are in place, that appropriate 
technology or technology is available, and that a specific capacity is available to service a region 
inhabited by at least 120,000 residents..
4 Dz.U. of 2016, item 250, hereafter also referred to as MCOM.
5 Dz.U. of 2015, item 184, hereafter also: CCPA.
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management entity of a given municipal waste treatment facility has a dominant posi-
tion, indicating in particular the two most ‘drastic’ cases, namely the situation where in 
a given municipal waste management area there are only one or two facilities operating 
with RMWPF status.
A dominant position as defined by the Office of Competition  
and Consumer Protection 
The problem to be tackled at the outset, before further discussion of the issue, is one of 
definition, i.e. in which situations can it be said that a given entity holds a dominant 
position in a particular market, according to the Competition and Consumer Protection 
Act?
As a starting point, we must refer to Article 4, item 10 CCPA, wherein it is stated 
that an undertaking holds a dominant position when its position “allows it to prevent 
effective competition in a relevant market by enabling it to act to a significant degree 
independently of its competitors, contracting parties and consumers”. The same article 
also contains the assumption that if the market share of an undertaking in the relevant 
market exceeds 40%, then the undertaking holds a dominant position. Further to this, 
Article 4, item 9 defines a ‘relevant market’ as the market in goods
 which by reason of their intended use, price and characteristics, including quality, 
are regarded by the buyers as substitutes and are offered in the area in which, by 
reason of the nature and characteristics of such goods, the existence of market bar-
riers, consumer preferences, significant differences in prices and transport costs, the 
conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous.6 
At this point, therefore, it has to be said that such a definition of a market can cer-
tainly cover the market designated – in the geographical sense – by the areas of all the 
municipalities included in the appropriate voivodeship plan for the municipal waste 
management region.
6 It is worth mentioning that the President of the Office for Competition and Consumer Pro-
tection expressed the view that the concept of a relevant market refers to all types of goods 
(services) of one kind which, because of their specific characteristics, differ from other products 
(services) in such a way that there is no possibility to exchange them. A relevant product mar-
ket covers all the goods that meet the same needs of buyers, have similar characteristics, similar 
prices, and represent a similar level of quality. An essential element of the relevant market is 
also its geographical dimension, which means the need to indicate an area where the conditions 
of competition applicable to certain goods are the same for all competitors. Therefore, in order 
to designate a relevant market, a particular activity is analyzed from the product (range) and 
geographical point of view (RWR 30/2009 and RWR Decision 17/2013). 
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It is obvious that with regard to the notion of “dominant position” it is possible to 
find numerous statements of the judiciary7 and the representatives of the doctrine.8 
Drawing on these resources for the purposes of this article/paper, the following can be 
assumed:
– a dominant position is a position which, due to an undertaking having access to 
technical knowledge, raw materials or capital, entails that the undertaking can 
set prices or control the production and/or distribution of essential products9;
– a dominant position is “thus qualified and defined in the legal category of mar-
ket power;”10 whereas the economic sense of dominant position “is expressed 
by the undertaking’s market power in the relevant market;11” this entails that 
market power should be identified with the effective exercise of influence on 
prices, supply, innovation, the variety and quality of goods and/or other param-
eters over a long period of time; in addition, the notion of dominant position 
can be associated with the phenomenon of “institutional monopoly,” the source 
of which can be legal and non-legal (factual) barriers to market entry;12
– the legal definition of dominant position contained in Article 4, item 10 of 
CCPA indicates three structural elements of this notion: the first being the 
possibility of preventing effective competition on the relevant market, the 
7 V. for example the judgement of the CJEU of 1.02.1978, 27/76, United Brands Company and 
United Brands Continental BV v  Commission of the European Communities, Court Re-
ports p207, or the judgement of CJEU of 13.02.1979, 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG 
v Commission of the European Communities, Court Reports, p. 461. On the other hand, in 
the Polish context, for example, the judgement of the High Court of 19.10.2006, III SK 15/06, 
OSNAPiUS 2007, no. 21–22, item 337, or the judgement of the High Court of 16.10.2008, III 
SK 8/08, Legalis.
8 V. for example N. Szadkowski, Drapieżnictwo cenowe w teorii ekonomii i w praktyce orzeczniczej 
polskiego organu antymonopolowego, in Konkurencja w gospodarce współczesnej, ed. C. Banasiński, 
E. Stawicki, Warszawa 2007; A. Brzezińska-Rawa, Dyskryminacja jako przejaw nadużycia po- 
zycji dominującej w unijnym prawie konkurencji, PiP 2011, no. 1; eadem, Zakaz nadużycia pozy-
cji dominującej we wspólnotowym i polskim prawie antymonopolowym, Toruń 2009; M. Szydło, 
Nadużywanie pozycji dominującej w  prawie konkurencji, Warszawa 2010; M. Sieradzka, Po- 
zew grupowy jako instrument prywatnoprawnej ochrony interesów konsumentów z  tytułu na- 
ruszenia reguł konkurencji, SIP LEX 2012; K. Kohutek, Praktyki wykluczające przedsiębiorstw 
dominujących. Prawidłowość i stosowalność reguł prawa konkurencji, SIP LEX 2012.
9 B. Majewska-Jurczyk, Dominacja w polityce konkurencji Unii Europejskiej, Wrocław 1998, p. 51. 
Cf. M. Bernatt, Orzecznictwo Trybunału Sprawiedliwości Wspólnot Europejskich w sprawach go-
spodarczych, Warszawa 2006, p. 337.
10 M. Szydło, op. cit., p. 79.
11 M. Bernatt, A. Jurkowska-Gomułka, T. Skoczny, Zakaz nadużywania pozycji dominującej, in 
Prawo konkurencji. System Prawa Prywatnego, vol. 15, ed. M. Kępiński, Warszawa 2014.
12 Ibidem. On the issue of market power, v. Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komen-
tarz, ed. T. Skoczny, Warszawa 2009, p. 233.
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   second – the ability to act to a large extent independently of competitors, con-
tractors or consumers, whereas the third is the legal presumption of a dominant 
position based on a quantitative criterion;13
– the aforementioned “possibility of preventing effective competition” derives 
from a privileged position on the market (market power), whether this results 
from a monopoly, or from a sufficient economic advantage over other market 
players (mainly competitors); significantly, a monopoly (exclusivity) can derive 
from the law (legal monopoly), from an administrative decision, e.g., a conces-
sion (administrative monopoly), from a natural characteristic of a given branch 
of the economy (natural monopoly), or from the undertaking having at its dis-
posal (de iure and/or de facto) networks and/or facilities that are necessary for 
the provision of services on the relevant market or relevant markets associated 
with it (network monopoly); these networks and devices are ‘essentials facilities’ 
for these markets!14
– in this respect, Skoczny emphasizes that when an undertaking holds a mo-
nopoly it is in a position to inhibit effective competition on every other market 
that it operates on, if that market is connected to the market over which it 
holds a monopoly;15
– in order to be recognized as possessing a dominant position on a market, an 
undertaking must be possessed of the power to ‘operate independently’ of 
other market players, that is, be able to implement its own individual market 
strategy, and must therefore be able to unilaterally set prices, inter alia, as well 
as the terms of contractual relations with other market participants, such as 
contractors;16
– the presumption of an undertaking holding a dominant position, if the un-
dertaking has a market share exceeding 40%, has the character of a rebuttable 
presumption.17 Its rebuttal is possible by demonstrating that despite the fact 
that the undertaking has a strong market position, at least one of the require-
13 Ibidem. On the issue of the quantitative presumption of dominant position cf. Ustawa o ochro-
nie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, ed. C. Banasiński, E. Piontek, Warszawa 2009, pp. 
129–131; This problem was also addressed by European case law, v. the judgement of the CJEU 
3.07.1991 in the case 62/68 AKZO Chemie BV v Commission of the European Communities, 
Court Reports 1991, p. I-3359.
14 Ustawa..., op. cit., ed. T. Skoczny, p. 238; cf. the judgement of the CJEU of 29.04.2004 in the 
case C-418/01 IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG, Court 
Reports 2004, p. I-05039.
15 Ustawa..., op. cit., ed. T. Skoczny, p. 239.
16 Ibidem, p. 242; cf. the judgement of the High Court of 16.10.2008, File ref. no. III SK 8/08, 
unpublished.
17 Ustawa..., op. cit., ed. T. Skoczny, p. 243.
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ments, as indicated in the above points related to the existence of a dominant 
position, is not fulfilled.18
In the context of these arguments, it should be noted that the assessment of whether 
a given undertaking holds a dominant position on a particular market must be carried 
out on a case-by-case basis, through consideration of the particular circumstances of the 
case. At the same time, it must be emphasized that the mixed waste management mar-
ket, with which this paper is concerned, is an unusually specific market, subject to strong 
regulation. Thus, despite this qualification, it can be argued that when, in accordance 
with a resolution of the regional assembly authorities on the implementation of a waste 
management plan, there is only one installation with RMWPF status in a given waste 
management region, this entity will have – de facto and de iure – a dominant position.
A single RMWPF facility in the region
The above assertion is to a large extent based on an analysis of selected provisions of the 
Maintaining Cleanliness and Order in the Municipality Act, or the Waste Act. From the 
former of these normative acts, the provision previously mentioned in the introduction 
should be referred to again, namely Article 9e, section 1, which obliges the entity col-
lecting municipal waste from property owners to: firstly, transfer segregated municipal 
waste to the recovery and disposal facility in accordance with the waste management 
hierarchy; secondly, transfer mixed municipal waste collected from property owners, as 
well as green waste and the stored residues from the sorting of municipal waste, to 
a RMWPF facility.19
In turn, it is clear from the regulations of the Office of Competition and Consumer 
Protection that, with the division into municipal waste management regions, together 
with the designation of municipalities belonging to these regions, and the designation of 
regional municipal waste treatment facilities in particular municipal waste management 
regions, and those facilities stipulated for replacing services in these regions, should there 
18 Ustawa..., op. cit., ed. C. Banasiński, E. Piontek, p. 129; K. Kohutek, M. Sieradzka, Ustawa 
o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, Warszawa 2008, p. 201.
19 The breach of such a warrant is an administrative offense for which the legislator has provided 
sanctions (Article 9, section 1, item 3 MCOM). In turn, under Article 9l, section 1 the RM-
WPF operator is obliged to conclude an agreement – for the management of mixed municipal 
waste, green waste or residues from the sorting of municipal waste for disposal – with all enti-
ties that collect municipal waste from property owners whose activity falls within the municipal 
waste management region. It is worth adding that under Article 9 MCOM, entities running 
RMWPF facilities face fines, inter alia, for not concluding a contract for the management of 
mixed municipal waste, green waste or residues from the sorting of municipal waste intended 
for storage with a municipal waste collector from property owners whose activities within the 
municipal waste management region. 
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be a malfunction at a facility, or if a facility is unable to receive waste for other reasons, 
or until such time as a regional facility for processing municipal waste has commenced 
operation, an instrument such as a Provincial Waste Management Plan is put into effect 
(see Article 35, section 4 WA). Nota bene that although the legislature grants local gov-
ernment assemblies considerable leeway20 in the process of drawing up such plans, they 
are not fully autonomous, since Article 34, section 1 WA21 stipulates that the objectives 
and purposes of waste management plans should determine the form of the provisions 
of the plans, as well as the executive decrees which are ancillary to them, which are re-
ferred to in Article 38 WA.22
In the course of analysing the provisions of the Waste Act, mention should also be 
made of a part of Article 20, which stipulates that waste, taking into account the waste 
management hierarchy, should be first subject to processing at its place of origin (sec-
tion 1), and waste which cannot be processed at its place of origin is to be transferred 
– into consideration the waste management hierarchy and the best available method, 
as stated in Article 207 from the Environment Protection Act of 27 April 2001, and 
technology, referred to in Article 143 of this Act23 – to the nearest location at which it 
20 It is true that in Article 35, section 4 WA the legislator defines in general terms the specific 
elements a municipal waste management plan should take (i.e. the elements characteristic for 
this level of planning act). However, it should be noted that not only does it leave the local 
governments much more leeway in dividing the area of the voivodeship into regions, as well as 
in designating the facilities, but neither does it provide any specific or precise preconditions on 
the basis of which this ‘designating’ process should take place. 
21 Article 34, section 1 WA: “To achieve the objectives set in environmental policy – of separating 
growth trends in the amount of waste produced and its environmental impact from the 
country’s economic growth trends, implementing the waste management hierarchy and the 
principles of self-sufficiency and proximity, and creating and maintaining in the country 
an integrated and sufficiently integrated network of waste management systems that meet 
environmental protection requirements – waste management plans must be developed.” Then 
Article 17 WA introduces the following hierarchy of waste management methods: 1) prevention 
of waste generation; 2) preparation for recycling; 3) recycling; 4) other recovery processes; 
5) neutralization.
22 It is worth mentioning here that this last provision entails, inter alia, that the resolution on the 
implementation of the municipal waste management plan stipulates the regions for municipal 
waste management, as well as the regional waste facilities in particular municipal waste man-
agement regions, and the facilities specified as replacements in those regions should the instal-
lations in question fail or are unable to receive waste for other reasons, and until the launch of 
a municipal waste treatment facility.
23 Article 143 of the Environmental Protection Act: “The technology used in newly commissioned 
or substantially revised facilities and equipment should meet the following criteria: 1) the use 
of substances with low potential risks; 2) efficient generation and use of energy; 3) ensuring 
rational consumption of water and other raw materials and materials and fuels; 4) use of waste-
free and low-waste technologies and the possibility of recovering the resulting waste; 5) type, 
coverage and size of emission; 6) using comparable processes and methods that have been 
successfully applied on an industrial scale; 8) scientific and technical progress.”
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can be processed (section 2); however section 7 also places an unambiguous prohibition 
on processing the following outside their place of origin: mixed municipal waste, the 
residue from the sorting of municipal waste, and the residue of mechanical-biological 
processing of municipal waste, as far as they are designated for storage or green waste. 
Significantly, importing the waste referred to in section 7 into the region is also prohib-
ited, if it is produced outside this region (section 8).24
To sum up these considerations, it is clear from the cited provisions of the Maintain-
ing Cleanliness and Order in the Municipality Act and the Waste Act, which very pre-
cisely regulate the market of mixed municipal waste and green waste, that if in a given 
region of municipal waste management there is only one facility with RMWPF status, 
considering such a facility as having a dominant position is justified, in the light of the 
provisions of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act. Undertakings that collect 
mixed communal waste and green waste are unable to choose an alternative facility to 
which these types of waste can be transported, and thus they are obliged to make use of 
the services provided by the sole RMWPF facility.
It is significant that this state of affairs is confirmed by the case-law of the President 
of the Office of Competition and Consumer Protection. It is worth referring to the 
decision of 27 June 2013,25 in which the President of the Office of Competition and 
Consumer Protection stated that the fact that the Chemeko-System partnership was 
the “administrator of the only RMWPF facility in the first six months of 2013 that 
received municipal waste from the area of municipalities concerned” was sufficient to 
conclude that Chemeko-System held a “very dominant position (monopolistic)” on the 
local market for the treatment and disposal of municipal waste in the designated mu-
nicipalities. The authority posited that the partnership had such economic power over 
the market that it was able to prevent not just effective competition, but was also able 
to operate to a large extent independently from counterparties, and actually to exploit 
its position on the market at their expense. It was emphasized that no other entity apart 
from Chemeko-System was entitled to set prices for services provided by a RMWPF 
facility in Rudna Wielka. In the factual and legal state of this case, the dominance of the 
company was evident in the power to impose exploitative conditions, including prices, 
on the counterparties – which in these relationships are companies providing services 
in the field of collecting mixed municipal waste. Consequently, the authority decided 
24 At the same time, the legislator allowed (section 9), in the event of designation of a facility for 
replacement service in the region, referred to in Article 38, section 2 item 2 WA, outside the 
area of the municipal waste management region where the waste was generated, bans were not 
implemented under sections 7 and 8.
25 Ref. no. RWR 17/2013. A similar position was taken by the President of the Office of Compe-
tition and Consumer Protection (CCPA) on the grounds of the non-binding waste law of 27 
April 2001, in the decision of 13 November 2009 (RWR 30/2009) concerning the Municipal 
Union of Commerce CZG-12 in with headquarters Dlugoszyn.
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that Chemeko-System, having a dominant position on the waste treatment and disposal 
market in the areas mentioned, has a significant influence on the level of competition 
on the interdependent market for the provision of services related to the collection and 
treatment of municipal waste, and is able to set prices in the market, thereby fulfilling 
the conditions necessary for establishing market dominance, as set out in the previously 
mentioned Article 4, section 10 CCPA.
Two RMWPF facilities in a region
The situation in the mixed municipal waste and green waste management in a given 
region takes on a distinctly different shape if two facilities with RMWPF status are 
operating there. In such a situation, undertakings dealing with waste collection are not 
obliged to deliver the mixed municipal and green waste to one, specific RMWPF facil-
ity, but can choose between two or more facilities which compete with each other, at 
least theoretically. In this situation, the market for this type of waste should be described 
as a duopoly. At the same time, even when there is a duopoly, in certain situations it is 
possible that a dominant position will emerge. However, this is not possible with regard 
to one undertaking, but rather to the existence of a  ‘collective dominant position’ on 
a given market. There is no legal definition for this concept in the Polish legal system, 
however. Furthermore, the concept has not been developed in autonomous case-law by 
Polish bodies responsible for competition protection. It is therefore important to base 
the definition on European case-law.
Prior to this, however, two general observations need to be made. Firstly, the notion 
of collective dominant position is inextricably associated with there being a certain eco-
nomic relationship between two economic entities on the same, relevant market,26 allow-
ing them to enter into a so-called ‘silent collusion,’ which leads to coordinated conduct 
and a common market strategy through parallel actions.27 Secondly, when considering 
the existence of a dominant position, the same qualitative criteria must be met, regarding 
the possibility of preventing effective competition in the relevant market and acting to 
a great extent independently of competitors, contractors and consumers.28
Turning to European case-law, it has to be mentioned that the concept of collective 
dominant position evolved over many years. To begin with, on the basis of the case So-
ciété alsacienne et lorraine de télécommunications et d’électronique Alsatel vs. SA Novasam,29 
the Court of First Instance linked the emergence of collective dominant position with 
26 The doctrine indicates that a collective dominant position can only be held by competitors, i.e. 
entrepreneurs, operating in the same relevant market, v. Ustawa..., op. cit.,  ed. T. Skoczny, p. 251. 
27 M. Modzelewska de Raad, T. Skoczny, Kolektywna pozycja dominująca.
28 M. Bernatt, A. Jurkowska-Gomułka, T. Skoczny, Zakaz nadużywania... 
29 Zbiory Orzecznictwa Trybunału Europejskiego 1988, p. 5987, items 21–22.
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the existence of structural links, such as capital or contractual relations. In subsequent 
years, however, European authorities moved away from such a narrow understanding of 
the concept of collective dominant position, as in the judgment of the Court of First 
Instance in Gencor Ltd v Commission of the European Communities,30 where it was stated 
that there is no reason why in establishing collective dominant position ‘economic links’ 
should be restricted to ‘structural links.’ The court indicated that the confirmed existence 
of collective dominant position also facilitates ‘ordinary’ economic interdependence, 
without structural links.31 Nevertheless, it was only in the subsequent judgments of the 
Court of First Instance, such as Airtours plc v Commission of the European Communities, or 
Laurent Piau v Commission of the European Communities that enabled the development 
of the three conditions that must be fulfilled in order for the existence of such market 
dominance to be confirmed. On their basis, so as to establish the emergence of a collec-
tive dominant position, it is necessary to demonstrate:
– sufficient incentives for a  company to enter into silent collusion; collective 
dominant position can thus be confirmed when every member of an oligopoly 
can know how the other members conduct themselves, and thereby confirm 
whether or not they employ a common strategy; the market must therefore be 
sufficiently transparent in order for its participants to react quickly and pre-
cisely to the conduct of others;
– the chance that this collusion will endure; the situation of silent collusion 
(implementing a common strategy) must endure for a certain time, i.e. there 
must be sufficiently effective (harsh) penalties for derogating from the common 
strategy;
– lack of opportunity for rivals outside the oligopoly or consumers to undermine 
this collusion; it must therefore be stated that there is no competitive pressure 
from other participants in this market (competitors, counterparties/buyers and 
consumers), including potential participants.32
Furthermore, it should be reiterated that, in order to establish the existence of a col-
lective dominant position as defined by CCPA, all the qualitative conditions pertaining 
to Article 4, section 10 CCPA must be met.
30 Zbiory Orzecznictwa Trybunału Europejskiego 1999, p. II-753.
31 This position was also confirmed in subsequent judgments by both the Court of First In-
stance in Compagnie maritime belge transports SA (C-395/96 P), Compagnie maritime belge SA 
(C-395/96 P) and Dafra-Lines A/S (C-396/96 P) v Commission of the European Communities, 
and of the European Court of Justice in the joined cases Compagnie maritime belge transports 
SA (C-395/96 P), Compagnie maritime belge SA (C-395/96 P) and Dafra-Lines A/S (C-396/96 P) 
v Commission of the European Communities.
32 Ustawa..., op. cit., ed. T. Skoczny, N.B. 441 regarding Article 4 CCPA.
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To sum up the above considerations, according to the doctrinal indications,33 it is 
possible to distinguish two situations in which the existence of a collective dominant 
position can be confirmed, fulfilling all the qualitative conditions of Article 4, section 
10 CCPA:
1. A situation of collective dominance based on capital ties or agreements;
2. A situation of collective dominance resulting from economic interdependence, 
without structural links, that is, ‘ordinary silent collusion.’
Therefore, it should be emphasized that it follows from both the views of the Eu-
ropean authorities and the indigenous doctrine of competition protection law that the 
occurrence of a collective dominant position is inextricably linked to the fact of there 
being an understanding between at least two undertakings that operate on the same 
relevant market. It must thus be unequivocally stated that only the existence of such 
an agreement could lead to the conclusion that undertakings operating on a market of 
a duopoly nature have a ‘collective dominant position’. It cannot be said that there is such 
a position in a situation when undertakings do indeed compete with each other, without 
co-ordinating their activities or implementing a common market strategy.
At this juncture, it is necessary to point out that a collective dominant position is in 
practice the only type of dominant position that can exist on a market that functions as 
a duopoly, because Polish antitrust case-law has consistently found that one entity does 
not have a dominant position in a market structured as a duopoly. To confirm this thesis, 
it is worth referring to the judgment of the Antitrust Court of 6 April34 that is often 
cited in subsequent case-law35. In this judgement, the Antitrust Court indicates that 
“a duopoly justifies rebuttal of the supposed dominant position held by them [undertak-
ings functioning on a relevant market], as referred to in antitrust law. The duopoly type 
market, where competing entities have a  similar share, is characterized by significant 
competition. Neither of the two competitors” has the ability – which is a characteristic 
ability for a dominant position on the market – to prevent effective competition that 
would leading to a rival sugar plant having a reduced market share, nor the ability to un-
dertake other independent actions without taking into account the behavior of competi-
tors and customers. “In principle, when there is a duopoly any new market proposal of 
one competitor is met with the immediate counter-proposal of the other, and the actual 
33 E. Modzelewska-Wąchal, Ustawa o ochronie konkurencji i konsumentów. Komentarz, Warszawa 
2002, pp. 45–47 and 56; Ustawa..., op. cit., ed. T. Skoczny, N.B. 442 regarding Article 4 CCPA.
34 XVII Amr 52/93.
35 This judgement is referred to in the Decision of the President of the Office of Competition and 
Consumer Protection (CCPA) no. RBG 2/2001, of the President of the Office of Competition 
and Consumer Protection (CCPA) RKR-39/2005, of the President of the Office of Competi-
tion and Consumer Protection (CCPA) no. RGD.8/2003, of the President of the Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection (CCPA) no. RKR-71/2007, and also in the Judgement 
of the Antitrust Court of 25.07.2001, XVII 96/00.
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competition of the entrepreneurs refutes the presumption of them holding a dominant 
position.”
Such a position, put forth in the case-law of an antitrust authority concerning du-
opoly markets, is an extraordinarily strong argument in support of the conclusion that, 
in a situation where two facilities with RMWPF status are operating in one municipal 
waste management region, it will not be possible to claim that either of the undertak-
ings managing the facilities actually holds a dominant position. However, it is worth 
reiterating that it is possible to establish the existence of a dominant position if there is 
an agreement between the entities running the RMWPF facilities, for example concern-
ing setting prices for receiving certain types of waste to the facilities. Such an agreement 
would entail that the market could be accurately described as being characterized by 
a collective dominant position.
Conclusions
In conclusion, it is clear that the existence of a dominant position on the mixed municipal 
waste management market, and green waste management market, in a given area of mu-
nicipal waste management, can be confirmed with certainty when there is only one facil-
ity granted with the statuss of regional facility for processing municipal waste. This results 
from the lack of choice with regard to the facility to which mixed municipal and green 
waste can be delivered, as stipulated in the Waste Act and the Maintaining Cleanliness 
and Order in the Municipality Act. These provisions introduce the necessity of delivering 
this type of waste to a RMWPF facility, and consequently de facto set up a monopoly on 
their processing, should only one RMWPF facility operate in the given region.
However, if in a given waste management region there two (or more) competing fa-
cilities with RMWPF status, it cannot be said that the entities running either (or any) of 
them holds a dominant position on the market. Such facilities can actually compete to 
receive the delivery of the same types of waste. In such a situation, a dominant position 
is only possible in the form of ‘collective dominant position’, for which the existence of 
an agreement between the entities managing the facilities in the region is essential.
Lastly, it is necessary to emphasize that the mere holding of a dominant position on 
a given market by an entity does not in itself result in an automatic breach of the provi-
sions of the Competition and Consumer Protection Act. According to Article 9, sec-
tion   of this normative act, only abuse of a dominant position on the relevant market is 
prohibited. Undoubtedly, however, as the case-law European Court of Justice highlights, 
an entity having such market power bears a special responsibility for the risks that its 
position pose to the proper functioning of the market.36
36 The judgement of the CJEU of 13.02.1979, 85/76, Hoffmann La Roche v. the Commission, 
Court Reports 1979, p. 461.
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summary
The Dominant Position of Regional Facilities  
for the Processing of Municipal Waste
This paper addresses the issue of the functioning of regional facilities for the processing 
of municipal waste in the light of the provisions of the Competition and Consumer Pro-
tection Act of 16 February 2007. The authors seek answers to the question of whether in 
certain specific situations it is possible to conclude that a given facility holds a dominant 
position on the market in which it operates. Two situations will be subjected to close 
analysis, namely those in which only one or two facilities with RMWPF status operate 
in a given region of municipal waste management.
Keywords: waste management, competition protection, dominant position, municipal 
waste, maintenance of cleanliness and order in a municipality, voivodeship waste man-
agement plans
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